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Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment

Mak, Vincent; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 250-264

We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al.,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049745

Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values

Wasser, Cédric - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 350-368

We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidderʼs shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049794

Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility

Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 143-156

We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individualsʼ skills is … unverifiable unless certified, and certification is costly. Agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market … important role to shape equilibria, and we remark that this is unusual in matching models with non-transferable utility. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049892

Investment incentives in bilateral trading

Lau, Stephanie - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 538-552

We characterize the surplus-maximizing trading mechanism under two-sided incomplete information and interim individual rationality, when one party can make a value-enhancing specific investment. This mechanism exhibits a trade-off between providing investment incentives and inducing voluntary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573643

Truth, justice, and cake cutting

Chen, Yiling; Lai, John K.; Parkes, David C.; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 284-297

Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603337

The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations

Maestri, Lucas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 412-418

We study a repeated principal–agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for T more periods if the evaluation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931182

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal; Sengupta, Kunal - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 598-612

significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573655

Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 97-116

We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595

On games of strategic experimentation

Rosenberg, Dinah; Salomon, Antoine; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 31-51

We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719481

On the acceptance of apologies

Fischbacher, Urs; Utikal, Verena - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 592-608

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719487

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