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Universal type structures with unawareness

Heinsalu, Sander - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 255-266

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in … structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore … sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049778

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 50-68

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049860

Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games

Haruvy, Ernan; Stahl, Dale O. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 208-221

Rule learning posits that decision makers, rather than choosing over actions, choose over behavioral rules with different levels of sophistication. Rules are reinforced over time based on their historically observed payoffs in a given game. Past works on rule learning have shown that when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597534

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 24-44

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738052

Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games

McKinney, C. Nicholas; Huyck, John B. Van - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 223-232

This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662454

Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 97-116

We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595

Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations

Mathevet, Laurent; Taneva, Ina - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 327-349

This paper studies supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary (finite) type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex-post implementation may not be possible. We propose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719489

Voronoi languages

Jäger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 517-537

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703

Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

Agranov, Marina; Potamites, Elizabeth; Schotter, Andrew; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 449-463

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049709

The probability of nontrivial common knowledge

Collevecchio, Andrea; LiCalzi, Marco - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 556-570

We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events when the size of the state space grows large. We adopt the standard epistemic model where the knowledge of an agent is represented by a partition of the state space. Each agent is endowed with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049728

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