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Auster, Sarah - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 503-521

This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal–agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agentʼs awareness strategically when proposing a contract and faces a tradeoff between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049755

Evolution of theories of mind

Mohlin, Erik - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 299-318

This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049877

Compulsory versus voluntary voting: An experimental study

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffy, John; Kim, Sun-Tak - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 111-131

We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753437

How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?

Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 1-23

Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738050

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence

Manski, Charles F.; Neri, Claudia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 232-254

We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738051

Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games

McKinney, C. Nicholas; Huyck, John B. Van - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 223-232

This paper investigates the possibility that people discover effective heuristics when playing similar perfect information games of varying complexity. We call this discovery experience Eureka Learning. We use a change-point analysis to identify 35 percent of our subjects as Eureka Learners.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662454

Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 97-116

We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595

Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study

Agranov, Marina; Potamites, Elizabeth; Schotter, Andrew; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 449-463

In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049709

Authority and communication in the laboratory

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 541-560

We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to … both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their … authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049784

Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Graham, Michael; Wolf, Jesse - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 115-130

In three experiments we examine the extent to which strategic sophistication (i.e., inductive reasoning, iterative dominance and level-k thinking) is determined by broader cognitive skills. In the first experiment we replicate previous results showing strong associations between cognitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049801

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