This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Tversky and Kahneman (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the...

We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey multi-unit demand auction: Vickrey's original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic/Ausubel auctions, with and without public dropout information reported during the auction. Although implemented by a weaker solution concept, behavior...

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...

We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our...

We consider second-price common-value auctions with an increasing number of bidders. We define a strategy of bidder i to be (ex-post, weakly) asymptotically dominated if there is another strategy for i that does, in the limit, as well against any sequence of strategies of iʼs opponents, and...