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Chen, Yan; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 181-213

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with … men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second …-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049904

Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 78 (2013) C, pp. 1-20

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed-bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049790

Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes - In: Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020), pp. 30-55

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614

'On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints', Third Version

Kotowski, Maciej H. - 2014

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060798

Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Lopez-Vargas, Kristian; Ozbay, Erkut Y. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 1-16

experiment. Preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190618

Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities

Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 269-291

We investigate a private value auction in which a single “entrant” on winning imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, “regular” bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049770

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

McGee, Peter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 312-326

auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049854

On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study

Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 690-710

. Additionally, the experiment assesses the effect of group decision-making. A Nash equilibrium prediction for individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049873

When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 170-183

this hypothesis with a laboratory experiment. The results indicate that, as predicted, revenue is significantly higher in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049893

Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

Chernomaz, Kirill; Levin, Dan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 611-635

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588269