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A contract-based model for directed network formation

Johari, Ramesh; Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N. - In: Games and economic behavior 56 (2006) 2, pp. 201-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003344054

Minimum cost arborescences

Dutta, Bhaskar (contributor); Mishra, Debasis (contributor) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866071

Efficient graph topologies in network routing games

Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 1, pp. 115-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852697

Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games

Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 1, pp. 462-487

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852794

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michael B.; Mansour, Yishay - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 1, pp. 51-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897144

Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism

Sharma, Yogeshwer; Williamson, David P. - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 1, pp. 174-190

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897168

Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games

Pimienta, Carlos - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 2, pp. 920-927

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871710

Minimum cost arborescences

Dutta, Bhaskar; Mishra, Debasis - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 120-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511294

Stochastic stability in best shot network games

Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo - In: Games and economic behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 538-554

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621872

Stable networks in homogeneous societies

Hellmann, Tim; Landwehr, Jakob - 2014

We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very general point. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that agents' utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386357