Economics rightfully represents the major basis for competition policy. Next to generating knowledge about competition and its welfare effects, the currently popular "more-economic approach" is charged with a number of additional hopes and expectations, leading to a reduction of the ambiguities...

An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in...

Economics rightfully represents the major basis for competition policy. Next to generating knowledge about competition and its welfare effects, the currently popular more-economic approach is charged with a number of additional hopes and expectations, leading to a reduction of the ambiguities of...

We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external...