This study investigates hospitals' dynamic incentives to select patients when hospitals are remunerated according to a prospective payment system of the DRG type. Given that prices typically reflect past average costs, we use a discrete-time dynamic framework. Patients differ in severity within...

Premium subsidies have been advocated as an alternative to social health insurance. These subsidies are paid if expenditure on health insurance exceeds a given share of income. In this paper, we examine whether this approach is superior to social insurance from a welfare perspective. We show...

Wir entwickeln einen Reformvorschlag, der den problematischen Selektionswettbewerb zwischen GKV und PKV beendet und zu einem fairen Systemwettbewerb führt. Jeder Bürger leistet einen einkommensabhängigen Beitrag zum Gesundheitsfonds und hat bei einem Wechsel in die PKV Anspruch auf...

This paper analyzes the referral processes between a gatekeeping primary-care physician (PCP) and a specialist. Specialists provide superior treatment for some patients but are more costly than PCPs. Agency problems arise because diagnostic signals are private information of the physicians....