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Costly litigation and optimal damages

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 37 (2014), pp. 86-89

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485875

The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort

Lando, Henrik Dan; Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 24 (2004) 2, pp. 209-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002372563

A solution to the problem of nuisance suits : the option to have the court bar settlement

Rosenberg, David; Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 26 (2006) 1, pp. 42-51

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003362668

The level of litigation : private versus social optimality of suit and of settlement

Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 19 (1999) 1, pp. 99-115

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001432202

The optimal level of corporate liabilty given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees

Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 17 (1997) 2, pp. 203-213

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222352

Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell - In: International review of law and economics 13 (1993) 3, pp. 239-257

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001149774

On offense history and the theory of deterrence

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell - In: International review of law and economics 18 (1998) 3, pp. 305-324

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001248800

Individual precautions to prevent theft : private versus socially optimal behavior

Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 11 (1991) 2, pp. 123-132

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001329861

A note on marginal deterrence

Shavell, Steven - In: International review of law and economics 12 (1992) 3, pp. 345-355

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001141088

Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?

Shavell, Steven - 2006

Overly strict legal standards are commonly thought to discourage parties from engaging in socially desirable activities. It is explained here, however, that excessive legal standards cannot lead to undesirable curtailment of activities when legal standards are enforced by liability for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733164