We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a...

We propose a theoretical model of a round-robin tournament with limited resources motivated by the fact that in a real-world round-robin sport tournament participating teams are sometimes forced to distribute their effort over an extended period. We assume that the participating teams have a...

We consider a market with two sellers, each having one unit of identical product, who compete for potential buyers with one-unit demand and a private valuation of this product. First, firms simultaneously post their prices. Then buyers observe these prices and choose a seller to submit a request...

This paper presents a complete description and the results of the Looking Forward Approach for cooperative differential games with transferable utility. The approach is used for constructing game theoretical models and defining solutions for conflict-controlled processes where information about...

We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value of such an N-stage game is of the order of N or of square root of N, as N tends to infinity.Our aim is...

The paper defines a family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelties of the paper are: a definition of every games embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism. Every game has two...

Supposing that Player 1's computational power is higher than that of Player 2, we give three examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game) where...

The paper examines an interaction of boundedly rational firms that are able to calculate their gains after reaction of an opponent to their own deviations from the current strategy. We consider an equilibrium concept that we call a Nash-2 equilibrium. We discuss the problem of existence and...

We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: "Nash-2" equilibrium, called also "threatening-proof profile" in [16, Iskakov M., Iskakov A., 2012b]. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not...

We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a continuum of Bayesian voters. Voters are uncertain about candidate positions, which are exogenously given and lie on a unidimensional policy space. Candidates take unobservable, costly...