The paper considers a two-country trade model of monopolistic competition featuring the heterogeneity of consumer preferences both within and across countries. The incorporation of heterogeneity into a traditional monopolistic competition setting is achieved by assuming different elasticities of...

We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale firms may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under...

Our new approach enriches the general additive monopolistic competition model (AMCM) - with a space of product characteristics: consumers' "ideal varieties". Unlike Hotelling, such partially localized competition involves intersecting zones of service among (continuously distributed) producers....

Equilibria and optima generally differ in imperfectly competitive markets. While this is well understood theoretically, it is unclear how large the welfare distortions are in the aggregate economy. Do they matter quantitatively? To answer this question, we develop a multi-sector monopolistic...

We develop a dynamic model of monopolistic competition which sheds light on how the interplay between the degree of product differentiation and intertemporal elasticity of substitution affects the steady-state equilibrium. Consumers love variety and split their labor endowment between wage...

The paper examines an interaction of boundedly rational firms that are able to calculate their gains after reaction of an opponent to their own deviations from the current strategy. We consider an equilibrium concept that we call a Nash-2 equilibrium. We discuss the problem of existence and...

We develop a two-sector model of monopolistic competition with a differentiated intermediate good and variable elasticity of technological substitution. This setting proves to be well-suited to studying the nature and origins of external increasing returns. We disentangle two sources of scale...

In the standard Krugman (1979) non-CES trade model, several asymmetric countries typically lose from increasing trade costs. However, all countries transiently benefit from such increase at the moment of closing trade, under almost-prohibitive trade costs (i.e., near autarky, which is possible...

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Even though preferences need not be additive and/or homothetic, the market outcome is still driven by the sole variable...

We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: "Nash-2" equilibrium, called also "threatening-proof profile" in [16, Iskakov M., Iskakov A., 2012b]. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not...