The message of this paper is that value of a coalition is power. This coincides with the view that coalitions do not have preferences, but merely represent the preferences of their members. Implications are discussed with the respect to (a) the hypothesis that power indices cannot explain...

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to assess actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

In this paper we develop a probablistic interpretation for the normalized Banzhaf index and the public good index. We then derive a way to decompose the normalized Banzhaf index into two parts. The first of them relates the Banzhaf index with the public good index and the other one on a special...

Traditional power indices are not suited to take account of explicit preferences, strategic interaction, and particular decision procedures. This paper studies a new way to measure decision power, based on fully specified spatial preferences and strategic interaction in an explicit voting game...