Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...

Principal-agent theory usually assumes that the players are perfectly rational. In contrast, real human decision makers are only boundedly rational. If a firm (principal) wants to design a work contract that maximizes profit, it should consider how workers (agents) will actually react rather...

Whether Individuals can build up and sustain mutually beneficial cooperation or, more generally, whether they comply with social norms, may depend crucially on the observability of their actions. If these cannot be monitored perfectly, the individual might be tempted to egoistically exploit this...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilizes to analyze games by their "game-like" sub-structures,...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

In equal punishment games like in ultimatum games first a proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in ultimatum games, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was...

By vetoing one question mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand, the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996), we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power....

Die Frage, welche Dartsellungsweise strategischer Interaktionen man als grundlegend für die spieltheoretische Analyse und insoweit als normale Form von Spielen anzusehen hat, ist keineswegs rein sprachlicher Natur. Systematische Gründe sprechen dafür, die Agentennormalform anstelle der...