Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilizes to analyze games by their "game-like" sub-structures,...

Problems of social coordination can be formalized as non-cooperative games with several equilibria. We know that in such situations serious problems of equilibrium selection arise which cannot be solved by traditional game theoretical reasoning. Conventions seem to be a powerful tool to solve...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only...

Die Frage, welche Dartsellungsweise strategischer Interaktionen man als grundlegend für die spieltheoretische Analyse und insoweit als normale Form von Spielen anzusehen hat, ist keineswegs rein sprachlicher Natur. Systematische Gründe sprechen dafür, die Agentennormalform anstelle der...

This paper brings together views on choice making as have been developed in philosophy, psychology, and economics. Starting from specific examples the relative merits of different approaches are discussed. The conclusion that models of boundedly rational behavior are the future of social science...