Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

We analyze a labor market program that subsidizes skill-upgrading occupational training for work-ers employed in small and medium sized enterprises. The program covers a substantial share of training costs. Nonetheless, take-up has been low. In an experimental setup, we mailed 10,000 brochures...

Mit der Einführung der Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende im Jahr 2005 wurde in Deutschland ein System von Sanktionen implementiert, das für Arbeitslosengeld(ALG)-II-Bezieher im Alter von unter 25 Jahren besonders starke Leistungsminderungen nach sich ziehen kann. In unserem...

This paper studies the effects of the high-speed internet expansion on the match quality of new hires. We combine data on internet availability at the local level with German individual register and vacancy data. Results show that internet availability has no major impact on the stability of new...

We analyze unique data on three sources of information on the probability of re‑employment within 6 months (RE6), for the same individuals sampled from the inflow into unemployment. First, they were asked for their perceived probability of RE6. Second, their caseworkers revealed whether they...