In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core …

, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept …, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A … achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core. …

, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept …, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A … achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core. …

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core …

between the methods. There are some properties that an allocation method should satisfy: full allocation, core compatibility … methods from the point of view if they are satisfying core compatibility. We test this with simulation where we add to the … existing literature that we test core compatibility with different assumptions on returns: on normal and t-distributed returns …

axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are …

-based cost games. We demonstrate that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we provide an … associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized … DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we …

stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with …