Showing 1 - 10 of 112
The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320256
A successful transformation to a carbon neutral energy system requires the correct investments in transmission and production capacity. In a zonal pricing electricity market, the one proposed by the European Commission to integrate the European electricity markets, I analyze the effects that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011917034
In centralized markets, producers submit detailed cost data to the day-ahead market, and the market operator decides how much should be produced in each plant. This differs from decentralized markets that rely on self-commitment and where producers send less detailed cost information to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012145482
producers compete with supply functions, as in wholesale electricity markets. For networks with a radial structure, we show that … in symmetric radial networks with uniform multi-dimensional nodal demand shocks. An equilibrium offer in such networks is … extended to mesh networks (as in electricity systems) although the resulting models do not simplify as in the radial case. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320251
Author: Edward J. Anderson, Pär Holmberg and Andrew B. Philpott Keywords: Pay-as-bid Auction; Divisible Good Auction; Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Wholesale Electricity Markets Pages: 71 Published: November 24, 2009 JEL-codes: D43; D44; C72 Download Wp814.pdf (756 kB) Abstract Using the concept of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320323
Capacity constraints on transmissions of electricity are raising an increasing policy concern as electricity markets are integrated around the world. But our understanding of the workings of such markets is still limited. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the impact of transmission...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442459
We consider a procurement auction, where each supplier has private costs and submits a stepped supply function. We solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and show that the equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a supplier.s cost sometimes result in a major change...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442477
Electricity markets are becoming more integrated around the world. However, the knowledge of the effects of different auction formats on suppliers' strategies in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs is still very limited. In this paper, I analyze the performance of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442483
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442490
Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers' market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320246