Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distributions prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in...

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing, which assumes that entry can occur only by installing new capacity, by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the...

We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit to evaluate how entry regulations affect profitability and market structure in retail. The model incorporates demand and store-level heterogeneity. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we find that the average entry costs...

We analyse in a theoretical framework the link between real-time and day-ahead market performance in a hydro-based and imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market. Theoretical predictions of the model are tested on data from the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool Spot (NPS).We reject the...

A successful transformation to a carbon neutral energy system requires the correct investments in transmission and production capacity. In a zonal pricing electricity market, the one proposed by the European Commission to integrate the European electricity markets, I analyze the effects that...

We show that a common regulatory mandate in electricity markets that use location-based pricing that requires all customers to purchase their wholesale electricity at the same quantity-weighted average of the locational prices can increase the performance of imperfectly competitive wholesale...

We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market....

Private equity firms (PE firms) have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. We show that the threat of a PE acquisition can trigger incumbent mergers in an otherwise mergerstable industry. This can help antitrust authorities maximize consumer surplus because...

Competition between oligopolist electricity generators is inhibited by transmission constraints. I present a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of an electricity market with a single lossless, but constrained, transmission line. The market admits equilibria in which generator withhold...

Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...