In a framework where mergers are mutually excluding, I show that firms pursue anti- rather than (alternative) pro …-competitive mergers. Potential outsiders to anti-competitive mergers refrain from pursuing pro-competitive mergers if the positive … externalities from anti-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential outsiders to pro-competitive mergers pursue anti …

that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked. This is optimal, if the relevant alternative to the merger is another … enhance welfare even though it blocks some welfare increasing mergers when the relevant alternative is the status quo. …

In a framework where mergers are mutually excluding, I show that firms pursue anti- rather than (alternative) pro …-competitive mergers. Potential outsiders to anti-competitive mergers refrain from pursuing pro-competitive mergers if the positive … externalities from anti-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential outsiders to pro-competitive mergers pursue anti …

There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus … presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a … possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that anticompetitive mergers may reduce competitors' share prices, if the merger …

factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce … mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when firms face indivisible costs of collusion …