Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...

Zonal pricing with countertrading (a market-based redispatch) gives arbitrage opportunities to the power producers located in the export-constrained nodes. They can increase their profit by increasing the output in the dayahead market and decrease it in the real-time market (the inc-dec game)....

Sweden faces a major challenge in the next decades because of a projected increase in electricity demand, aging supply infrastructure and the transition to an energy system with a substantial share of weather-dependent production. This paper discusses the incentives to invest in production...

Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support generation owners. Capacity payments can mitigate imperfections associated with "missing money" in the spot market and solve transitory capacity shortages caused by investment cycles, regulatory changes, or technology shifts. We discuss...

I evaluate the effect of the 2011 Swedish electricity market splitting reform on the allocation of wind power, exploiting a unique data set of all Swedish applications for wind power since 2003. By comparing investments in each price zone before and after the reform using a...

Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...

We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives...

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can...

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in call demand. Empirical work has shown call demand to increase significantly with income. For any positive income effect, network operators prefer a termination rate above marginal cost if networks are...

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in call demand. Empirical work has shown call demand to increase signi ficantly with income. For any positive income effect, network operators prefer a termination rate above marginal cost if networks are...