We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group...

We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers on the other side of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that...

We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

This paper studies an industry in which firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open platforms, as opposed to closed, are extendable so third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping...

This paper studies an industry in which firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open platforms, as opposed to closed, are extendable so third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping...

We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market....

Zonal pricing with countertrading (a market-based redispatch) gives arbitrage opportunities to the power producers located in the export-constrained nodes. They can increase their profit by increasing the output in the dayahead market and decrease it in the real-time market (the inc-dec game)....

This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to...

In part I of this paper, we proposed a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) to analyze imperfect competition of oligopoly producers in two-stage zonal power markets. In part II of this paper, we propose a solution algorithm which decomposes the proposed MILP model into several subproblems and...