We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually...

Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These 'i-bounds' generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not require...

In this paper, we develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical...

In this paper, we develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical...

Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These 'i-bounds' generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not require...