We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public...

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption. Under a separability assumption, we show that the observation of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow to identify preferences and the decision process up to...

The extent to which like-with like marry is particularly important for inequality as well as for the outcomes of children that result from the union. In this paper we discuss approaches to the measurement of changes in assortative mating. We derive two key conditions that a well-defined measure...

We extend the collective model of household behavior to allow for the existence of public consumption. Under a separability assumption, we show that the observation of the labor supplies and the household demand for the public good allow to identify preferences and the decision process up to...