marriage does not appear to translate into economic protection. …

– transfers from the groom to the bride’s parents at marriage. We develop a simple model in which households are exposed to income …

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption …. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable …. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …

estimate a life-cycle model of marriage, labor supply and divorce under limited commitment to better understand the mechanisms …

be interpreted through a structural model of the marriage market; in particular, a crucial issue is how they relate to … variations in the economic surplus generated by marriage. We propose a very general criterion of increase in assortativeness, and … US over the last decades, and conclude that assortative matching has increased, particularly at the top of the education …

participation. We build an overlapping generations life-cycle, heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-markets model with education, labor … education. We find that the current financial aid system in the U.S. improves welfare, and removing it would reduce GDP by 4 …

education, labour supply, and consumption/saving decisions. Altruistic parents make inter vivos transfers to their children … of funding for college education. We find that the current financial aid system in the U.S. improves welfare, and …

participation. We build an overlapping generations life cycle model with education, labor supply, and consumption/saving decisions …. Cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children depend on the cognitive skills and education of parents, and affect education … be used to fund education, supplementing grants, loans and the labor supply of the children themselves during college …