We present a novel approach that incorporates individual entity stress testing and losses from systemic risk effects (SE losses) into macroprudential stress testing. SE losses are measured using a reduced-form model to value financial entity assets, conditional on macroeconomic stress and the...

This paper describes how behavioral elements are relevant to financial supervision,regulation, and central banking. It focuses on (1) behavioral effects of norms (social, legal,and market); (2) behavior of others (internalization, identification, and compliance); and(3) psychological biases. It...

The deferred recognition of COVID-induced losses at banks in many countries hasreignited the debate on regulatory forbearance. This paper presents a model where thepublic's own political pressure drives regulatory policy astray, because the public is poorlyinformed. Using probabilistic game...

This paper documents the features of a new database that focuses on changes in the intensity in the usage of several widely used prudential tools, taking into account both macro-prudential and micro-prudential objectives.The database coverage is broad, spanning 64 countries, and with quarterly...

We show that macroprudential regulation can considerably dampen the impact of globalfinancial shocks on emerging markets. More specifically, a tighter level of regulation reducesthe sensitivity of GDP growth to VIX movements and capital flow shocks. A broad set ofmacroprudential tools contribute...

Drawing on the 2016 update of the IMF's Central Bank Legislation Database, this paper examines differences in central bank legal frameworks before and after the Global Financial Crisis. Examples from select countries show that many central bank laws have undergone changes in objectives,...

Bank liquidity stress testing, which has become de rigueur following the costly lessons of the global financial crisis, remains underdeveloped compared to solvency stress testing. The ability to adequately identify, model and assess the impact of liquidity shocks, which are infrequent but can...

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...

Whether and to what extent tougher bank regulation weighs on economic growth is an open empirical question. Using data from 28 manufacturing industries in 50 countries, we explore the extent to which cross-country differences in bank liquidity and capital levels were related to differences in...

Despite revisions to bank capital standards, fundamental shortcomings remain: the rules for setting capital requirements need to be simpler, and resolution should be an essential part of the capital requirement framework.We propose a new system of capital regulation that addresses these needs by...