Banks guarantee international trade through letters of credit. This paper analyzes what happens to trade when the critical role of banks as trade guarantors is compromised. Using the case of the Greek capital controls in 2015, the events around which led to a massive loss of confidence in the...

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible....

The paper considers the generic arguments for and against the creation of a unified regulatory agency, covering each of the main types of financial institutions (banks, insurers and securities firms). The strongest arguments for unification are the enhanced oversight of financial conglomerates...

Successful implementation of macroprudential policy is contingent on the ability to identify and estimate systemic risk in real time. In this paper, systemic risk is defined as the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis and this conditional probability is modeled in a fixed effect...

An increasing number of countries - including in Latin America - are reforming their financial stability frameworks in the aftermath of the financial crisis, in order to establish a stronger macroprudential policy function. This paper analyzes existing arrangements for financial stability in...

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the...

Intro -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. LONG- TERM SYSTEMIC RISKS -- III. INNOVATIONS IN RISK TRANSFER MARKETS -- IV. INCOMPLETE MARKETS -- V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- References.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE BANKING SECTOR: LONG-TERM TRENDS AND SHORT- TERM DEVELOPMENTS -- III. ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS OF THE BANKING SECTOR -- IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE -- III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD -- IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.