We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...

This paper takes stock of the current state of development of the financial systems in five Central European transition economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) that are also leading EU accession candidates. It presents both a progress report and an...

This paper discusses operational aspects of official emergency liquidity support to individual institutions under stress. It argues that properly designed lending procedures, clearly laid-out authority and accountability, as well as disclosures rules, will promote financial stability, reduce...

This paper reviews the nature of central bank involvement in 26 episodes of financial disturbance and crises in Latin America from the mid-1990s onwards. It finds that, except in a handful of cases, large amounts of central bank money were used to cope with large and small crises alike. Pouring...

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to...

Until the recent financial crisis, the safety and soundness of financial institutions was assessed from the perspective of the individual institution. The financial crisis highlighted the need to take systemic externalities seriously when rethinking prudential oversight and the regulatory...

The paper examines recent episodes of government involvement in corporate debt restructurings. It argues that corporate debt restructuring is an important step toward recovery from a financial crisis. We then discuss the rationale for, and modalities of, the state intervention in corporate debt...

This paper outlines a way to estimate transition matrices for use in credit risk modeling with a decades-old methodology that uses aggregate proportions data. This methodology is ideal for credit-risk applications where there is a paucity of data on changes in credit quality, especially at an...

Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability. This paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a...

In contrast to corporate defaults, regulators typically take a number of statutory actions to avoid the large fiscal costs associated with bank defaults. The distance-to-default, a widely used market-based measure of corporate default risk, ignores such regulatory actions. To overcome this...