Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE -- III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD -- IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

This paper summarizes the results of a survey of financial supervisory agencies in IMF member countries conducted in 2007. Responses were received from 140 financial sector supervisors in 103 countries. A majority of these are separate stand-alone agencies, though, a majority of bank supervisors...

This paper studies how Uruguay's regulatory framework was gradually strengthened to address shortcomings identified during the 2002-03 crisis, to align with international standards and, more recently, to deal with cyclical pressures resulting in an acceleration of bank lending. In particular,...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SUPERVISORY PRACTICES -- III. TOWARDS GOOD PRACTICES -- COUNTRY PRACTICES: SURVEY RESULTS -- CURRENCY-INDUCED CREDIT RISK IN SELECTED BANKING SYSTEMS -- References.

This paper proposes an integrated crisis management and resolution framework for the EU's single banking market. It comprises a European Resolution Authority (ERA), armed with the mandate and the tools to deal cost-effectively with failing systemic cross-border banks, and is designed to address...

Successful implementation of macroprudential policy is contingent on the ability to identify and estimate systemic risk in real time. In this paper, systemic risk is defined as the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis and this conditional probability is modeled in a fixed effect...

An increasing number of countries - including in Latin America - are reforming their financial stability frameworks in the aftermath of the financial crisis, in order to establish a stronger macroprudential policy function. This paper analyzes existing arrangements for financial stability in...

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the...

Intro -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. LONG- TERM SYSTEMIC RISKS -- III. INNOVATIONS IN RISK TRANSFER MARKETS -- IV. INCOMPLETE MARKETS -- V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- References.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE BANKING SECTOR: LONG-TERM TRENDS AND SHORT- TERM DEVELOPMENTS -- III. ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS OF THE BANKING SECTOR -- IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY.