Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. BACKGROUND -- III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH -- A. Sovereign Borrowing Cost Model -- B. Launch Spreads -- C. Launch Yields -- IV. CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX I. MAIN DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION -- REFERENCES.

This paper examines the effects of IMF financial assistance on economic governance in developing countries, based on panel data analyses of perceived governance indicators. It uses a two-stage approach to address possible endogeneity issues. The results show that successful implementation of IMF...

We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SOME PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING THE DESIGN OF FISCAL CONDITIONALITY -- III. MACROECONOMIC THRESHOLDS AND PCS Inflation -- IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF QUANTITATIVE FISCAL CONDITIONALITY DESIGN -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE LITERATURE -- III. STYLIZED FACTS OF IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS -- IV. DETERMINANTS OF PRIOR ACTIONS -- V. PRIOR ACTIONS AND PROGRAM SUCCESS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- References -- Appendix.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE -- III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE -- IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER -- V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. BACKGROUND -- III. IDENTIFYING CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES EPISODES -- IV. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS -- V. IMF SUPPORT AND CRISIS PREVENTION -- VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS -- References.