Intro -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. LONG- TERM SYSTEMIC RISKS -- III. INNOVATIONS IN RISK TRANSFER MARKETS -- IV. INCOMPLETE MARKETS -- V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- References.

The paper analyzes the quality of financial sector regulation and supervision around the globe. Unlike studies that collect and analyze data on regulation and supervision ""on the books,"" this study also analyzes available information on supervisory implementation, making use of data from...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE BASIC MODEL SETTING -- III. MODEL 1: A SIMPLE MODEL WITH NON-RANDOM DEFAULT PROBABILITIES -- IV. INTRODUCING THE POISSON APPROXIMATION -- V. MODEL 2: THE MODEL WITH KNOWN PROBABILITIES REVISITED -- VI. MODEL 3: THE MODEL WITH RANDOM DEFAULT...

Successful implementation of macroprudential policy is contingent on the ability to identify and estimate systemic risk in real time. In this paper, systemic risk is defined as the conditional probability of a systemic banking crisis and this conditional probability is modeled in a fixed effect...

An increasing number of countries - including in Latin America - are reforming their financial stability frameworks in the aftermath of the financial crisis, in order to establish a stronger macroprudential policy function. This paper analyzes existing arrangements for financial stability in...

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE BANKING SECTOR: LONG-TERM TRENDS AND SHORT- TERM DEVELOPMENTS -- III. ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS OF THE BANKING SECTOR -- IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SUSCEPTIBILITY OF BANKING REGULATION TO CAPTURE -- III. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION WITH MORAL HAZARD -- IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS -- V. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

This paper sets out general principles for the design of financial stability frameworks, starting from an analysis of the objectives and tools of financial regulation. The paper then offers a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the two main models that have emerged for modern...