We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows...

Following a period of privatization and restructuring, commercial banks in Central and Eastern Europe and, more recently, in the Balkans have rapidly expanded their lending to the private sector. This paper describes the causes of this expansion, assesses future trends, and evaluates its policy...

We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the...

Dollarization of liabilities (DL) has emerged as a key factor in explaining the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial and currency crises. "Usual suspects" of causing DL comprise "fatalistic" determinants such as a long history of unsound macroeconomic policies and development and...

This paper uses a DSGE model with banks and financial frictions in credit markets to assess the medium-term macroeconomic costs of increasing capital and liquidity requirements. The analysis indicates that the macroeconomic costs of such measures are sensitive to the length of the implementation...

Better “financial soundness†of banks could help mitigate the volatility of financial cycles by reducing banks’ risk exposure. But trying to improve financial soundness in the midst of a downturn can do the opposite—further aggravating the contraction of credit....