This paper concerns optimal emissions of greenhouse gases when catastrophic consequences are possible. A numerical model is presented which takes into account both continuous climate-feedback damages as well as the possibility of a catastrophic outcome. The uncertainty in the model concerns...

In this paper a simple model is used to analyse the strategic behaviour of countries that bargain over CO2 emission reductions. Five main world regions are considered and their incentives to sign an international agreement on climate change control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to...

This paper surveys recent advances in climate models by emphasising how quantitative instruments can answer the main crucial questions addressed by the policymakers involved and therefore aid the formulation of effective global climate policies. The limits of existing models are highlighted and...

This report summarises the main ideas, proposals, scientific achievements, consensus and conflicting issues that emerged at the Second EFIEA Policy Workshop, held at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Palazzo delle Stelline, Corso Magenta 63, Milan, Italy, March 4th-6th, 1999. EFIEA, the European...

The Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emission targets for industrialised countries without accounting for reductions carried out prior to 2008, the beginning of the first commitment period. There exists only one exception, the project-based Clean Development Mechanism where credits accrue...

In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full co-operation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all...

Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterise the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (Section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an elementary economic...

This paper focuses on the link between the group co-operation and the unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. As we consider that this last behaviour occurs when bargaining failed, we call it a precautious commitment. We also show that...

We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.