Countries increasingly rely on independent fiscal councils to constrain policymakers' discretion and curb the bias towards excessive deficits and pro-cyclical policies. Since fiscal councils are often recent and heterogeneous across countries, assessing their impact is challenging. Using the...

The paper discusses the effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions-or fiscal councils-in taming the deficit bias that emerged in the 1970s. After a review of the main theoretical arguments and recent trends about fiscal councils, we develop a stylized model showing how a fiscal council can...

The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which...

The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater ""procedural"" flexibility in the Pact''s implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer''s room to apply judgment on underlying policies and...

It is widely argued that Europe''s unified monetary policy calls for international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved in such coordination in the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization. A simple model identifies the circumstances under which coordination may be...

This paper analyzes the decision of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of fiscal restraints similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. The model shows that a pact may harm structural reforms, sacrificing future growth for present stability....