available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in … the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a …

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks … to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic ""New …-Keynesian"" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the …

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent … opinion. One natural application of the theory is in the field of monetary policy where the model provides a new theory of …

endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the …

central bank independence increases fiscal discipline and results in lower inflation and growth, generating a short …-run institutional Phillips curve. In the presence of sufficiently strong negative long-run externalities of inflation onto growth …, higher CBI also increases fiscal discipline and generates lower inflation, however, it also yields higher growth and …

is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will …

may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank … chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when …