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Johnson, Omotunde E. G. - 1997

A government desiring support for its policy reform program, without coercion, behaves as if it faces a political constraint. Citizen support depends on the estimate, by at least some minimum proportion of the population, that the program will succeed and the outcome will be in their individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014403279

Optimal prudential regulation of banks and the political economy of supervision

Tressel, Thierry; Verdier, Thierry - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388760

Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design

Vandenbussche, Jérôme - 2006

The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400188

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

Eggertsson, Gauti B. - 2003

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks … to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic ""New …-Keynesian"" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400234

The Political Economy of Redistributive Social Security

Pestieau, Pierre - 1999

Population aging puts significant pressure on social security systems that are based mainly on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) formula and determined by the political process in which both retirees and future retirees participate. This paper demonstrates that in an economic and demographic steady state,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400549

Rent Seeking

Chakraborty, Shankha - 2005

This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014401029

Political Risk Aversion

Valderrama, Laura - 2009

This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014402381

Votingon the ""Optimal"" Size of Government

Olters, Jan-Peter - 2000

Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country’s overall budget can be derived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014403510

A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime

Sun, Yan - 2002

Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399538

Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle

Le Borgne, Eric - 2002

We investigate whether private information about citizens'' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in the former case can entry be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399613

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