Based on internal data, this paper finds that the capacity development program of the IMF's Statistics Department has prioritized technical assistance and training to fragile and conflict-affected states. These interventions have yielded only slightly weaker results in fragile states than in...

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998). Delegation trades-off the cost of having a possibly incompetent...

This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the...

Trends in the size of U.S. government are examined. In the postwar period, general government primary spending rose by 1⁄4 percent of GDP a year through 1975, stabilizing thereafter. With higher social transfers offset by a lower burden of defense spending, expansion reflected a baby-boom...

This paper examines interactions between self-interested agents in a two-tier government hierarchy, consisting of a central authority and bureaucrats in a two-stage game, where the actions of agents affect private sector allocations. Conditions under which lower-tier corruption arises as an...

Central government wage expenditures accounted for 7 percent of GDP in 99 countries during 1980-90 (unweighted average). Regression analysis indicates that federations, countries with high populations and high per capita incomes, heavily indebted countries, and small low-income economies tend to...