This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For...

This paper explicitly takes into account the dynamic oligopolistic rivalry among source producers to evaluate the degree of exchange rate pass-through. Using recent time-series techniques for the case of imported automobiles in Switzerland, the results show that prices are strategic complements...

Tax laws and administrations often treat different size firms differently. There is, however, little research on the consequences. As modeled here, oligopolists with different efficiencies determine the size distribution of firms. A government that maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus,...

Brazil's public-sector wage bill is comparatively high. It grows inertially and competes with other spending. Rightsizing the wage bill could stimulate administrative efficiency and bring more equity into a system where public employees earn more than private in comparable professions. Most...

This paper uses a vertical differentiation duopoly framework to analyze firms’ relocation decisions, when the removal of trade barriers or restrictions on capital outflows or inflows (“globalization”) allows them to serve the domestic market through foreign plants in low-wage countries....

We investigate the conditions for sustainability of debt roll-over schemes under uncertainty. In contrast with the requirements identified in recent research, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability of such schemes is that the asymptotic interest rate on government...

We analyze in this paper how the mutual dependence of private sector expectations in different countries on one another influences the stability of fixed exchange rate regimes. The crisis probabilities of countries trading with one another are interdependent because wage setters react to an...

In a general equilibrium in which bribe-extracting bureaucrats can endogenously choose regulatory burden and delay, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery can be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm surveys, this paper finds evidence consistent...

This paper examines interactions between self-interested agents in a two-tier government hierarchy, consisting of a central authority and bureaucrats in a two-stage game, where the actions of agents affect private sector allocations. Conditions under which lower-tier corruption arises as an...