Policymakers across countries have been seeking to strengthen the institutional framework to control fiscal costs and feedback effects to the real economy generated by bank failures. On a cross-section of countries, we find evidence that suggests that bank supervisors' intervention in bank...

This paper argues that in the European Union (EU) deposit insurance funds are too difficult to use in bank resolution and too easy to use outside resolution. The paper proposes reforms in three areas for the effective management of bank failures of small and medium-sized banks in the European...

Based on detailed regulatory intervention data among German banks during 1994-2008, we test if supervisory measures affect the likelihood and the timing of bank recovery. Severe regulatory measures increase both the likelihood of recovery and its duration while weak measures are insignificant....

This paper builds on a Technical Note produced as part of the IMF’s 2010 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) review of the United States. It addresses enterprise-wide oversight of financial groups, a key tool to mitigate systemic risk. Focusing on legal arrangements, it recommends...

More than a century later, the Banca Romana crisis still provides useful insights on the challenges of preserving financial stability. This paper reviews the case and discusses implications that can be relevant today. The crisis was spurred by an unsustainable credit expansion encouraged by...

We formulate the “High Liquidity Creation Hypothesis” (HLCH) that a proliferation in the core activity of bank liquidity creation increases failure probability. We test the HLCH in the context of Russian banking, which provides a natural field experiment due to numerous failures experienced...

Depositor preference and collateralization of borrowing may reduce the cost of settling the conflicts among creditors that arises in case of resolution or bankruptcy. This net benefit, which may be capitalized into the value of the bank rather than affect creditors’ expected returns, should...

Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors'' access to their claims is delayed or ""frozen."" While the...