Showing 1 - 4 of 4
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932489
We study a model where an employer, trying to fill a vacancy, engages in optimal sequential search by drawing from two subpopulations of candidates who differ in their ""discourse systems"": during an interview, a minority candidate with a discourse system not shared with the employer conveys a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399671
We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399698
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014404237