This paper argues that in the European Union (EU) deposit insurance funds are too difficult to use in bank resolution and too easy to use outside resolution. The paper proposes reforms in three areas for the effective management of bank failures of small and medium-sized banks in the European...

Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors'' access to their claims is delayed or ""frozen."" While the...

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible....

This paper tests the role of different banks'' liquidity funding structures in explaining the banks'' failures, which occurred in the United States between 2007 and 2009. The results highlight that funding is indeed a significant factor in explaining banks'' probability of default. By confirming...

Policymakers across countries have been seeking to strengthen the institutional framework to control fiscal costs and feedback effects to the real economy generated by bank failures. On a cross-section of countries, we find evidence that suggests that bank supervisors' intervention in bank...

More than a century later, the Banca Romana crisis still provides useful insights on the challenges of preserving financial stability. This paper reviews the case and discusses implications that can be relevant today. The crisis was spurred by an unsustainable credit expansion encouraged by...

This paper reviews how recent studies of banking crises differ with regard to the dating, length, and costs of the crises. Significant discrepancies in these features suggest the absence of analytical consensus. The data allow an examination of the relation between perceived crisis length, as an...

In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors'' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors'' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed...

This paper tests empirically the proposition that bank fragility is determined by bank-specific factors, macroeconomic conditions and potential contagion effects. The methodology allows for the variables that determine bank failure to differ from those that influence banks’ time to failure (or...