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Monetary policy frameworks : an index and new evidence

Unsal, D. Filiz; Papageorgiou, Chris; Garbers, Hendre - 2022

We provide a multidimensional characterization of monetary policy frameworks across three pillars: Independence and Accountability, Policy and Operational Strategy, and Communications (IAPOC). We construct the IAPOC index by analyzing central banks' laws and websites for 50 advanced economies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013170321

Comfort in floating : taking stock of twenty years of freely-floating exchange rate in Chile

Albagli, Elías; Calani, Mauricio; Hadzi-Vaskov, Metodij; … - 2020

Chile offers an example of a country that has overcome the fear of floating by reducing balance sheet mismatches, enhancing financial market development, as well as improving monetary, fiscal, and political institutions, and strengthening policy credibility. Under the floating regime, Chile's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012252010

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence

Eggertsson, Gauti B. - 2003

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks … to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic ""New …-Keynesian"" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400234

Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

Le Borgne, Eric - 2007

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent … opinion. One natural application of the theory is in the field of monetary policy where the model provides a new theory of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400341

Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions

Castellani, Francesca - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400978

Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited

Välilä, Timo - 1999

The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014403428

On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance

Musalem Borrero, Alberto - 2001

This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014403642

Strategic Interactions Between An Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

Stehn, Sven Jari - 2008

We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014401471

Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate

Crowe, Christopher W. - 2006

A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399793

Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Small Open Economies

Worrell, DeLisle - 2000

This paper is concerned with the design of institutional arrangements for low inflation in small open economies. In the real world of information asymmetries, uncertain expectations and changeable preferences, it is not enough to create an autonomous and publicly accountable central bank. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014399901

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