We explore the relationship between internal governance and the disciplining mechanisms created by the threat of short selling (i.e. “short-selling potential”). We argue that the presence of short selling increases the cost of agency problems for shareholders and incentivizes them to improve...

We propose that the presence of short-term investors, such as short sellers, does not necessarily enhance short-termism. On the contrary, based on a sample of 11,969 firms across 33 countries over the 2003-2009 period, we observe that the threat of short selling increases long-term (i.e., R&D)...

We propose that the presence of short-term investors, such as short sellers, does not necessarily enhance short-termism. On the contrary, based on a sample of 11,969 firms across 33 countries over the 2003-2009 period, we observe that the threat of short selling increases long-term (i.e., R&D)...