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Scoring Auctions with Non-Quasilinear Scoring Rules
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2014
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of … the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit … first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052249
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Horizontal mergers, firm heterogeneity, and R&D investments
Matsushima, Noriaki; Sato, Yasuhiro; Yamamoto, Kazuhiro - 2009
We investigate the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine how a merger affects the output, investment, and profits of firms, whether firms have merger incentives, and, if so, whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332309
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Horizontal Mergers, Firm Heterogeneity, and R&D Investments
Matsushima, Noriaki - 2009
We investigate the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine how a merger affects the output, investment, and profits of firms, whether firms have merger incentives, and, if so, whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156465
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Nature of competition and new technology adoption
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2014
This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421480
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Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2014
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of … the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit … first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421484
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Auctions where incomes are private information and preferences (non quasi-linear) are common knowledge
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2010
-price and all-pay auctions and show that revenue equivalence fails to hold. With risk neutrality we also show that under mild … restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is zero for all the three auctions and the all-pay auction with zero reserve … valuation is a symmetric equilibrium even for first-price and all-pay auctions. Here also, the expected revenue is the highest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332482
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Auctions Where Incomes are Private Information and Preferences (Non Quasi-Linear) are Common Knowledge
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2010
-pay auctions and show that revenue equivalence fails to hold. With risk neutrality we also show that under mild restrictions, the … revenue maximising reserve price is zero for all the three auctions and the all-pay auction with zero reserve price fetches … a symmetric equilibrium even for first-price and all-pay auctions. Here also, the expected revenue is the highest with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137937
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Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption
Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh - 2014
This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057120