The paper explains why some firms transfer their technology to competitors without direct compensation. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising two groups in terms of their valuations of...

We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In...

We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In...

The paper explains why some firms unilaterally share their technology with competitors. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising three groups in terms of their valuations of product...