The paper explains why some firms transfer their technology to competitors without direct compensation. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising two groups in terms of their valuations of...

We investigate the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine how a merger affects the output, investment, and profits of firms, whether firms have merger incentives, and, if so, whether...

We investigate the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine how a merger affects the output, investment, and profits of firms, whether firms have merger incentives, and, if so, whether...

The paper explains why some firms unilaterally share their technology with competitors. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising three groups in terms of their valuations of product...