This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a...

In dynamic principal-agent relationships, it is sometimes observed that the agent's reward depends only on the final outcome. For example, a student's grade in a course quite often depends only on the final exam score, where the performance in the problem sets and the mid-term exam is ignored....

Wage inequality between individuals has changed little in Japan in recent times unlike in other developed countries. We examine changes in wage inequality within and between establishments during the prolonged stagnation period in Japan. Using a micro-level worker-establishment dataset from 1991...

If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game....

Using a model where a monopoly chooses its commodity's quality as well as its quantity, we consider optimal regulation whenthe monopoly's costs are unknown to the regulator. Regarding quantity and quality, the results are a natural extension of Baron and Myerson (1982): the levels of quantity...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.

Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older...

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate how side track (or collusion) among agents affects the principal's welfare in a hidden action model. We assume that the agent's actions are mutually observable but not contradictable among them and hence direct coordination of actions via side...

We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on...