This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...

This paper studies the relationship between horizontal product differentiation and the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. By deriving linear demand from a representative consumer's utility and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game, we...

We consider mergers between multi-product firms in a market with monopolistically competitive fringe of single-product firms. Aggregate product variety is determined by product variety choices of multi-product firms and entry/exit decisions of single-product firms. Mergers can generate marginal...

This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by firms in a horizontally differentiated industry. In our model there are several suppliers of a new technology. The extent of the cost reduction depends on the quality of the new technology. A firm has to buy the technology...

This paper studies the relationship between horizontal product differentiation and the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. By deriving linear demand from a representative consumer's utility and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game, we...

This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

This paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and a strong entrant in a differentiated market. Suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm, but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself. Then the incumbent may allow entry of the...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

We provide a model in which upstream producers, whose production cost is quadratic in quantity, sell their products through two distribution channels, a traditional channel and an external retailer. Some producers (called "large" producers) supply to both channels, whereas other producers...

We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium...