This paper examines the optimal entry policy towards oligopoly in a globalized world. In an open economy free entry is socially suboptimal, but corrective tax policy to curb entry proves insufficient unless internationally harmonized. Thus, while conferring the gains from trade, globalization...

This paper examines the optimal entry policy towards oligopoly in a globalized world. In an open economy free entry is socially suboptimal, but corrective tax policy to curb entry proves insufficient unless internationally harmonized. Thus, while conferring the gains from trade, globalization...

Regionalism is taking two forms. It is occurring firstly through free trade arrangements and secondly through monetary arrangements. In this paper, we highlight the issues related to the reversal of sequence between trade integration (free trade agreement) and monetary integration (a monetary...

This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

This paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and a strong entrant in a differentiated market. Suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm, but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself. Then the incumbent may allow entry of the...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

This paper reflects on consequentialism which underlies the traditional normative economics. It asserts that the informational basis of normative economics should be expanded so that the intrinsic value of social choice procedures should be properly taken into account along with the value of...

We provide a model in which upstream producers, whose production cost is quadratic in quantity, sell their products through two distribution channels, a traditional channel and an external retailer. Some producers (called "large" producers) supply to both channels, whereas other producers...

We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium...