Showing 1 - 10 of 151
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403
experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350
experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … of truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220116
Baron and Myerson (1982): the levels of quantity and quality are lower under asymmetric information than under symmetric … information. Unlike their work, however, the price level can be higher or lower under asymmetric information, depending on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602839
Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain … independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others … indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older economist, however, can infer his ability from past information. Those who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602901
The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602948
This note compares project evaluation rules for large projects by Negishi and Harris and points out that the extensions by Harris depend on his implicit weakening of the criterion for potential welfare improvement compared with Negishi's original welfare criterion.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602998
We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information … about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to … disclose information to the governments in the Brander-Spencer setting. With quantity competition, we find firms disclosing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332231
We examine a foreign firm's choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) under country-specific cost uncertainty. Unlike exporting, FDI exposes foreign and home firms to common shocks. This results in a correlation of strategies, harming the firms. However, the exposure to common...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332405
We examined investment behavior in the Japanese manufacturing industry using investment revision data to analyze investment behavior from a fresh angle. We tested the martingale investment hypothesis and then the q-theory of investment by looking at the response of stock return and investment to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332475