Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 136
Cover Image
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples
Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2021
In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544008
Cover Image
Vickerey allocation rule with income effect
Saitoh, Hiroki; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2005
We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332345
Cover Image
College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
Pais, Joana; Pintér, Agnes; Veszteg, Róbert F. - 2008
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms-the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms-in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that-in line with the theory-in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350
Cover Image
College Admissions and the Role of Information : An Experimental Study
Pinter, Agnes; Veszteg, Robert Ferec; Pais, Joana - 2008
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that - in line with the theory -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220116
Cover Image
Comparing the influence of conflict on the perceptions of rich and poor: Testing the hypothesis of Acemoglu and Robinson
Yamamura, Eiji - 2014
Conflict can cause negative externalities to arise, and this can result in economic loss. Such externalities are also … this hypothesis, the present paper explores how the degree of conflict between rich and poor people is associated with … where people perceive conflict between rich and poor to be high; (2) an individual is more likely to consider the income …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421469
Cover Image
Pre-negotiation Commitment and Internalization in Public Good Provision through Bilateral Negotiations
Matsushima, Noriaki - 2019
public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the … public good is produced excessively as a result of the commitment when the supplier's bargaining power is sufficiently strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903962
Cover Image
Does Centralised Bargaining Reduce Individual Effort?
Brunello, G - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1996
This paper looks at the relationship between centralisation of the wage bargain and individual effort when the effort elicitation mechanism is provided by intra-firm, rather tha inter firm, wage differentials.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602843
Cover Image
Buyer Size and Bargaining Power.
Chipty, T; Snyder, C-M - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1996
The paper examines the conventional wisdom that large buyers pay lower prices to suppliers than do small buyers. In the model, a supplier separately bargains with n buyers. The buyer's size is endogenous since they can merge prior to negotiations with the supplier.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602891
Cover Image
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer
Sadakane, Hiroshi - 2017
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013674
Cover Image
A Coordination Game Model of Charitable Giving and Seed Money Effect
Hatsumi, Kentaro - 2011
If potential donors for a charity project possess the warm-glow properties in their preferences, we can represent their behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable giving based on a simple global coordination game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207907